This paper examines delivery of public health care services in India, in the broader context of decentralization. It provides an overview of the basic features and recent developments in intergovernmental fiscal relations and accountability mechanisms, and examines the implications of these institutions for the quality of public service delivery> It then addresses recent policy proposals on the public provision of health care, in the context of decentralization. Finally, it makes suggestions for reform priorities to improve public health care delivery.
Introduction
India spends about 5 percent of its GDP on health care: the official figure is a little over 6 percent, but a comprehensive health expenditure accounting exercise put the figure at 4.6 percent in 2001 -02 (Government of India, 2005 . This proportion is roughly in line with developing countries at similar income levels. Where India appears to be an outlier is in the proportion of health spending that is undertaken in the public sector. At about 20 percent, the Indian figure is well below most other countries. Of course, the ultimate test is in terms of outcomes. Here, also, India does rather poorly: it has failed to do as well in health care outcomes as might be predicted by its average income level. This relative performance stands in contrast to China, for example (Table 1) , which does better than average. Policy makers have naturally been concerned by India's relative failure in achieving good health outcomes, and spending more on health has been one solution that has been explored. Another issue is the quality of the spending that already takes place. The lack of proper incentives for delivery of public health services is widely recognized as a factor in spending quality, and changes in delivery mechanisms have been proposed to tackle that problem. governments] so that there is local accountability of the public health care providers, and problems relating to poor performance can be sorted out locally" (Planning Commission, 2001) . The question is whether and how decentralization can improve public sector delivery of health care in India, and that is the focus of this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Indeed, there is evidence of these problems even for welloff urban consumers in India (Das and Hammer, 2005, 2007) as well as in poor rural areas (Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004a,b 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 2
India contains multiple languages, religions and ethnicities, and over one billion people. It has sustained a working democracy for six decades at relatively low levels of income, and is also distinguished by its institutional richness and the relative stability of these institutions (Kapur, 2005) . The amendments reduced state governments' discretionary control over elections to local government bodies (e.g., Rao and Singh, 2003) . They also changed tax and expenditure assignments to local governments by specifying their authority and responsibilities more fully, and instituted a formal system of state-local fiscal transfers. Problems with the new legislation and its implementation include lack of clarity, mismatches between revenue and expenditure authority, and lack of local administrative capacity.
Responsibilities
The constitution laid out the areas of responsibility Table 2 is an outcome of constitutional assignments. The states also assume a significant role for subjects in the Concurrent List, such as education and social insurance.
The constitution assigned tax powers by creating exclusive tax categories for the center and states. Most broad-based taxes were assigned to the center, including taxes on income from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, and customs duty. A long list of taxes was assigned to the states, but only the tax on the sale of goods has turned out to be significant for revenues. This narrow effective tax base is largely a result of the political power of rural landed interests that has eroded the use of taxes on agricultural land or incomes.
The situation with respect to local governments is somewhat distinct from the center-state division of powers. Bank, 2004) indicate that rural local governments, in particular, rely heavily on grants, often with restrictive conditions attached, so measured rural local revenues include a large component whose spending is predetermined by higher-level agencies (Rajaraman, 2001) .
Accountability Mechanisms
Accountability in governance means that members and 
Implications for Service Delivery
Despite elaborate institutional mechanisms within and across levels of government in India, service delivery is poor at all levels of government (World Bank, 2006 . Neither overall nor public sector per capita health spending (Table 3) World Bank, 2005) , particularly at subnational levels.
Clearly, these are general reforms that are not restricted to health care delivery mechanisms.
High levels of corruption also contribute to inefficiency of public service delivery. Examples include industry regulation (Dollar et al., 2002) and state government job assignments (Wade, 1985) . "Retail corruption" is widespread in health care, electric power, police and judiciary functions, taxation and land administration, and education (Transparency International, 2002) .
Finally, the low efficiency of delivery of health and education in rural areas because of poor performance (absenteeism and low effort) by government employees is well documented (e.g., Drèze and Gazdar, 1996; PROBE, 1999; World Bank, 2006; Howes and Murgai, 2005; Chaudhury et al., 2006; Kremer et al., 2005) . There is some evidence that institutional innovations that correct frontline provider incentives or modify the conditions of provision can improve efficiency (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2007; Duflo and Hanna, 2005) , and that decentralization of accountability systems can improve incentives if implemented effectively, as in the Madhya Pradesh Education Guarantee Scheme (e.g., Sharma and Gopalakrishnan, 2001) . However, decentralized monitoring is no panacea, since it may be subverted by collusion between government employees (e.g., nurses) and local administrators or politicians (Duflo, 2008) .
The third indicator of inefficiency in public service delivery is private or self-provision. This is natural and acceptable if there are income effects (e.g., private vs.
public transportation) associated with quality of service.
Thus, the rich may always choose this route for many quasipublic goods. However, in the Indian case, the middle class and poor rely on costly and inefficient methods of private provision when public service delivery is poor in quality. 
Household

Health Care Policy and Decentralization
The elaborate institutional structure of development planning, including public health services, has not been able to deliver good outcomes for the rural populations of India that need it most. In the introduction, a 2001 document from the PC was quoted, noting the lack of accountability, leading to pervasive absenteeism and low effort, and offering decentralization as a solution. Five years later (Planning Commission, 2006) , however, the same problems were highlighted once more: "Rural health care in most states is marked by absenteeism of doctors/health providers, low levels of skills, shortage of medicines, inadequate supervision/monitoring, and callous attitudes.
There are neither rewards for service providers nor punishments to defaulters."
The government's own analysis identified a failure to decentralize enough as the reason for lack of improved health outcomes, "The 10th Plan aimed at providing essential primary health care, particularly to the underprivileged and underserved segments of our population.
It also sought to devolve responsibilities and funds for health care to PRIs. However, progress towards these objectives has been slow and the 10th Plan targets … have been missed" (Planning Commission, 2006) . In some ways, the response to failure of implementation in targeted areas of policy was counterintuitive, trying to do even more, and to operate on a broader front. The so-called integrated policy for public health services delivery seemed to veer toward a "kitchensink" approach, failing to address the different needs of different dimensions of health care. Thus, communicable disease control may require more centralized provision than basic curative care or reproductive services. It is also not clear that the district (the level of rural government directly below the state) is necessarily better than the state for coordinating different aspects of health policy and spending (Hammer, Aiyar and Samji, 2006 More generally, it can be argued that all subnational governments in India have to rely too heavily on transfers from higher-level governments. These transfers can be uncertain, and restricted in ways that make their effective use difficult. Conditional transfers are typically poorly monitored. Centralized taxation and large transfers also destroy the linkage between benefits and costs for beneficiaries of public expenditure on service delivery.
Hence, a more radical reform than increasing the flexibility of transfers would be to reduce the need for transfers by decentralizing some kinds of tax authority (Singh, 2006) .
The case can also be made that, since many of the 
